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Abstract 
The health-risking informal service is transacted when the expected extra satisfaction 
rate exceeds the ratio of the expected extra cost to the formal service price. Its 
prevalence decreases with the costs of risk bearing for the providers and clients. Law-
enforcement effort lowers (raises) the informal service equilibrium price when the 
ratio of the providers’ and the clients’ degrees of absolute risk aversion is greater 
(smaller) than the ratio of the law-enforcement elasticities of their cost bearing. 
Spending on law enforcement is efficient when the public cost of the expected chain-
infection stemming from the informal service exceeds a threshold level. (JEL I19, 
K32)  
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1.  Introduction 
   This paper analyzes a market where, due to rewarding clients with a greater 
stimulation and providers with a higher price, a health-risking service is illegally 
traded alongside a safe and legal alternative. The service suppliers are numerous, 
registered and their operation is randomly inspected. Formally, the suppliers offer the 
legal service in a regulated fixed price. Informally, they solicit clients to have, or are 
induced by clients to provide, the more stimulating illegal service for an unreported, 
hence untaxed, additional payment. The apparently legal sex markets in several 
Australian and North American states and the quasi-legal sex markets in many other 
states and countries are notable venues for such formal and informal transactions. 
Despite the lack of economic studies on this issue, the analysis of the demand and 
supply of informal, unprotected sex service in an apparently legal market is of a 
special interest as the prevalence of this service contributes to the spread of 
HIV/AIDS.  
   In a legal sex industry, periodical tests for sexually transmitted diseases are 
mandatory for service providers. The right of clients to see the providers’ medical 
certificates helps eliminating those who are positively tested at the beginning of the 
period. Despite these precautionary measures the market is porous. Periodical medical 
tests are not mandatory for clients and hence it is possible that several unaware, or 
selfish, clients carry sexually transmitted diseases. Providers engaged in informal 
service with these clients might contract those diseases and pass them on to other 
clients prior to their exclusion from the market by the subsequent medical test. 
   In view of the health risk and the risk associated with illegal activity, providers 
endowed with a strong risk aversion refrain from offering, and are not induced to 
supply, the informal service at the average market rate. However, familiarity and 
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intimacy erode caution. Even a strongly risk-averse provider might be eventually 
induced by a persistent regular client to supply an informal service for a handsome 
extra payment. Likewise, a strongly risk averse client might be sooner or later allured 
by his regular service provider to experience the more stimulating service. 
   In addition to having different degrees of risk aversion, providers, and similarly 
clients, can be dissimilar in other respects. Providers may have different physical 
characteristics, interpersonal skills and, subsequently, appeal. Clients may have 
different sexual preferences and incomes. It is therefore sensible to divide the sex 
market into independent sub markets, each is relevant for a fairly homogeneous group 
of clients and their matching fairly homogeneous group of providers. This paper 
analyzes the effect of providers’ and clients’ costs of risk aversion on the price and 
prevalence of the informal service and on the usefulness of law-enforcement effort in 
such sub markets. Due to the intimate nature of the service, data are not available and 
hence the analysis deals with theoretical aspects per se. 
   The analysis assumes, for tractability, that all intended providers are simultaneously 
tested for sexually transmitted diseases on prescheduled dates. The market is, 
therefore, spanned over a period defined by two successive tests. The actual service 
providers are those tested negative at the beginning of the period. They are rational, 
risk averse, identical, and operating independently. The clients are rational, risk averse 
and anonymous. Some of the clients, though identical in all other respects to the rest, 
are already carrying sexually transmitted diseases but are not aware of this fact. The 
service providers do not know which clients carry these diseases. Since clients do not 
necessarily use the service of one provider exclusively, each provider regards all the 
clients, new and regulars, as having equal probability of carrying sexually transmitted 
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diseases. In addition to the toll of health hazard, the overall costs of risk bearing for 
the providers and the clients rise with the law-enforcement effort.     
   The analysis of the price and prevalence of informal transactions in a sub market of 
sex between two successive tests is structured as follows. The supply of the informal 
service is derived in Section 2. Section 3 analyzes the demand for the informal 
service. Section 4 summarizes the effects of the providers’ and clients’ costs of risk 
bearing on the informal service equilibrium price and prevalence and draws the 
implications of these effects for the impact of law-enforcement effort on the price of 
the informal service. Section 5 derives the public-cost minimizing law-enforcement 
spending. Section 6 briefly concludes. 
 
2.  The Supply of the Informal Service 
   The analysis of the supply of the informal service is based on the following 
assumptions. The number of formal and informal service providers, n, during the 
period is large. The service providers are identical, full-time, independent, risk averse, 
rational operators. The durations of formal and informal services are fixed and 
identical and hence the sum of the number of formal service ( SFN ) and the number of 
informal services ( SIFN ) offered by any service provider during the period is fixed and 
known - N .  
   The cost associated with each formal service is constant, Fc . The cost associated 
with any informal service, IFc , is a normally distributed random variable with mean 
cµ  and with variance, 
2
cσ , containing two components. The first component, 
2
sH
σ , 
reflects the provider’s risk of contracting a disease during an informal service and its 
implications for her future health, employment and income. The second component, 
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)(2 gsσ , represents the provider’s risk stemming from random inspection of the nature 
of her service. It is an increasing function of the spending on law-enforcement effort, 
g, during the period ( 0/)(2 >∂∂ ggsσ ). The larger the spending on law-enforcement 
effort the higher the likelihood of inspection and adverse effects on the service 
provider’s license and flow of future incomes. As these components are positive and 
additive, 
0)(222 >+= gssHc σσσ .         (1) 
   The price of the formal service ( FP ) is regulated and fixed. The price of the 
informal service ( IFP ) is higher than the price of the formal service. From the 
perspective of the individual service provider, these prices are exogenously 
determined. As the operator is registered and as it is a common knowledge that N 
services are given during a period by a full-time operator, every service is reported to 
the tax office and a flat tax rate, 10 << τ , is applied. The informal services are falsely 
reported as formal services.  
   Summing up, the service provider’s net profit (π ) from operation during the period 
is normally distributed with 
S
IFFcFIFFF NcPPNcPE )](][())(1()( −−−+−−= µτπ     (2) 
and  
222 )]([)var( SIFssH Ngσσπ += .       (3) 
   The service provider’s utility from the net profit is negatively exponential with a 
unit upper-bound, reflecting a constant degree of absolute risk aversion 0>sR : 
)exp(1 πs
s Ru −−= .                     (4) 
 
 5
Maximizing the service provider’s expected utility ( ))(exp(1 πsRE −− ) with respect to 
S
IFN  is equivalent to maximizing the power term in the moment-generating function 
of the provider’s normally distributed profit evaluated at sR− .
1  Namely, 
})]([5.0)]()[())(1{(max
222 S
IFssHs
S
IFFcFIFFFS
IFN
NgRNcPPNcP σσµτ +−−−−+−− . 
   As 0)]([ 22 >+ gR ssHs σσ , the second-order condition for maximum is satisfied and 
an interior solution exists so long that the price differential )( FIF PP −  exceeds the 
expected cost differential )( Fc c−µ . The necessary condition for maximum implies 
that any provider’s supply of informal service is:  
)]([
)()(
22 gR
cPP
N
ssHs
FcFIFS
IF σσ
µ
+
−−−
= .                              (5) 
Consequently, the aggregate supply of the formal service during the period ( sIFN
)
) is 
given by 
 
)]([
)]()[(
22 gR
cPPn
N
ssHs
FcFIFs
IF σσ
µ
+
−−−
=
)
.       (6) 
 
3.  The Demand for the informal service 
   The analysis of the demand for the informal service is conducted within the 
following framework. The number of clients, m, of the formal and informal services is 
large. Some of the clients carry sexually transmitted diseases. They are not aware of 
this fact. They are anonymous and identical to the rest of the clients in any other 
respect. The clients are risk averse, rational and aware of the risks associated with 
informal services. Although the analysis does not explicitly deal with the scheduling 
                                               
1 See Freund  (1956) for the development of this procedure, Hammond (1974) for a discussion of its 
generality, and Yassour et al. (1981), Collender and Zilberman (1985), Levy et al. (1989) and Levy 
(1992) for various applications. 
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of the formal and informal services over the period, the following argument is made. 
Due to health-risk, clients might have been inclined to demand informal services at 
the early part of a period defined by two consecutive tests - close to the day on which 
the providers have passed the medical test. However, such an inclination would have 
triggered a concerted law-enforcement effort in the early part of the period, thereby 
generating a high risk of disruption and reputation loss for clients and offsetting the 
health-risk moderating effect of a concentrated early demand for informal services. 
For this reason, and due to the habitual nature of sexual activity, the demand for the 
informal service is likely to be evenly spread over the period.   
   For each client,   
D
FN  is  the number of  formal services sought during the period, 
D
IFN  is the number of  informal services sought during the period, 
Fr  is the return on the risk-free formal service, 
IFr  is a normally distributed random return on the risky informal service with mean 
IFµ  and variance 
2
IFσ , and 
y  is a predetermined income accruing during the period. 
   Since the informal service involves more exciting characteristics than the formal 
service, FIF r>µ .
2 Taking the scalar 0>α  to represent the rate of the expected 
satisfaction differential between the informal and formal services, 
FIF r)1( αµ += .         (7) 
The variance of the return on the informal service represents the risk stemming from 
an unsafe service for the client’s health, 02 >
dH
σ . It also reflects the client’s concerns 
about the inconvenience and loss of reputation accompanying a possible inspection of 
                                               
2 A similar assumption is made by Levy (2002) with respect to the satisfaction from unprotected sex 
relative to condom-protected sex.   
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the nature of the service, 0)(2 >gdσ  - an increasing ( 0/)(
2 >∂∂ ggdσ ) function of the 
spending on law-enforcement effort (g) during the period.3 Namely,  
0)(222 >+= gddHIF σσσ .        (8) 
   Since sexual activity is strongly habitual, and for tractability, a fixed fraction 0>ε  
of the client’s income is spent on formal and informal services and the client’s 
periodical utility from formal and informal services is independent from the client’s 
utility from spending on other goods, ))1((ˆ yu d ε− . It is portrayed by a negative 
exponential function displaying a unit upper-bound and a constant degree of absolute 
risk aversion 0>dR . Namely, the client’s periodical utility is given by 
]}}[exp{1{))1((ˆ DIFIF
D
FFd
dd NrNrRyuu +−−+−= ε .               (9) 
   As a fixed fraction of the client’s income is spent on formal and informal services 
and as the prices of the formal and informal services are exogenously given, the 
client’s number of formal services during the period can be expressed as 
D
IF
F
IF
F
D
F NP
P
y
P
N −=
ε
.                   (10) 
Consequently, the client’s budget-constrained periodical utility is 
]})([exp{1))1((ˆ DIFIF
D
IF
F
IF
F
Fd
dd NrN
P
P
P
y
rRyuu +−−−+−=
ε
ε .             (11)         
   The client chooses the combination of numbers of formal services and informal 
services that maximizes his expected utility. Recalling the definition of the moment 
generating function and that IFr  is normally distributed, maximizing ))(( ⋅
duE  with 
respect to DIFN  is equivalent to maximizing 
 
                                               
3 This assumption is consistent with the argument made by Behrens, Caulkins, Tragler and Feichtinger 
(1997) and by Tragler, Caulkins and Feichtinger (2001) that law-enforcement effort increases the costs 
of risk bearing for illicit-drug users. 
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222 )]([5.0)1()( DIFddHd
D
IFF
D
IF
F
IF
F
F NgRNrNP
P
P
y
rv σσα
ε
+−++−= .                    (12)   
As 0)]([ 22 >+ gR ddHd σσ  the second-order condition for maximum is satisfied, and so 
long that the relative expected return on the formal service ( α+1 ) exceeds the 
relative price ( FIF PP / ), there exists an interior solution. The necessary condition for 
maximum implies that each client’s demand for illegal service during the period is  
)]([
)1(
22 gR
r
P
P
N
ddHd
F
F
IF
D
IF σσ
α
+
−+
= .                                                            (13) 
Consequently, the aggregate demand for the informal service ( dIFN
)
) during the period 
is   
)]([
)1(
22 gR
r
P
P
m
N
ddHd
F
F
IF
d
IF
σσ
α
+
−+
=
)
 .                   (14) 
 
4.  Risk Bearing and the Informal Service Price and Prevalence 
    In view of the aggregate supply and demand equations (6) and (14), the informal 
service equilibrium price is  
)]([)]([
)]([)()]([)1(
2222
2222
*
gnRgR
P
r
m
gRcPngRrm
P
ddHdssHs
F
F
ddHdFcFssHsF
IF
σσσσ
σσµσσα
+++
+−++++
=             (15) 
and the prevalence of the informal service (i.e., the equilibrium number of informal 
services transacted during the period) is 
)]([)/1()]([)/1(
]/)[(
2222
*
gRmrgRnP
Pc
N
ddHdFssHsF
FFc
IF σσσσ
µα
+++
−−
=
)
.              (16) 
(See detailed derivation in the Appendix.) 
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COROLLARY 1: The rate of the expected extra satisfaction from the informal service 
( 1/ −= FIF rµα ) must be greater than the ratio of the informal service expected extra 
cost to the formal service price ( FFc Pc /)( −µ ) for the informal service to be traded.  
       
   This corollary is straightforwardly obtained from equation (16). The underlying 
rationale is as follows. From equation (14), the demand for the informal service is 
positive only when 
F
FIF
P
PP −
>
*
α .  From equation (6), the supply of the informal 
service is positive only when FcFIF cPP −>− µ
* . Consequently, if a positive quantity 
of the informal service is traded then .
*
F
c
F
FIF
P
c
P
PP −
>
−
>
µ
α  
 
COROLLARY 2: The prevalence of the informal service decreases with the costs of 
risk bearing for the providers and the clients. (Straightforward from equation (16).)  
 
PROPOSITION 1: The equilibrium price of the informal service rises with the service 
providers’ costs of risk bearing ( )]([ 22 gR ssHs σσ + ) and decreases with the clients’ 
costs of risk bearing ( )]([ 22 gR ddHd σσ + ). (See proof in the Appendix.) 
 
   Recalling that 0/)(2 >∂∂ ggsσ  and 0/)(
2 >∂∂ ggdσ , the costs of risk bearing for the 
informal service providers and their clients rise with the spending on law-enforcement 
effort. In view of Proposition 1, the incremental costs of risk bearing for the service 
providers and clients lower the prevalence of the informal service. As suggested by 
the following proposition, the direction of the net effect of the spending on law 
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enforcement effort on the equilibrium price of the informal service depends on the 
ratio of the providers’ and the clients’ degrees of absolute risk aversion and on the 
ratio of the providers’ and the clients’ elasticities of cost bearing, which are defined 
as: 
)]([
)/)((
)]([
)]([
22
2
22
22
g
ggg
gR
g
g
gR
ssH
s
ssHs
ssHs
s
σσ
σ
σσ
σσ
ξ
+
∂∂
=
+∂
+∂
≡               (19) 
and  
)]([
)/)((
)]([
)]([
22
2
22
22
g
ggg
gR
g
g
gR
ddH
d
ssHs
ddHd
d
σσ
σ
σσ
σσ
ξ
+
∂∂
=
+∂
+∂
≡ .             (20) 
 
PROPOSITION 2: If 
d
s
d
s
R
R
>
ξ
ξ
, then the equilibrium price of the informal service 
rises with law-enforcement effort. If  
d
s
d
s
R
R
<
ξ
ξ
, then the equilibrium price of informal 
service falls with law-enforcement effort. (See proof in the Appendix.) 
 
5.  Public-Cost Minimizing Law-Enforcement  
   As the probability and intensity of epidemics such as HIV/AIDS rise with the 
prevalence of unsafe sex, spending on law-enforcement effort that suppresses the 
prevalence of the informal service in the apparently legal market of sex may be 
desirable from the perspectives of the general public. The total public costs of the 
prevalence and control of the informal service during the period are     
gNC IF +=
*β  
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where, β  is the public cost of the average chain of infections stemming from an 
informal service within the period, and where *IFN   is given by equation (16) with, for 
tractability, linear specifications of )(2 gsσ  and )(
2 gdσ : 
][)/1(][)/1(
/)(
2222
*
gRmrgRnP
Pc
N
ddHdFssHsF
FFc
IF σσσσ
µα
+++
−−
=
)
.              (21) 
   As C is convex in g, the public-cost minimizing law-enforcement periodical 
spending satisfies 
01
]}[)/1(][)/1{(
])/1()/1][(/)([
22222
22
=+
+++
+−−−
=
∂
∂
gRmrgRnP
RmrRnPPc
g
C
ddHdFssHsF
ddFssFFFc
σσσσ
σσµαβ
            (22) 
which implies 
0
])/1()/1[(
])/1()/1[(
])/1()/1[(
]/)([
)/1()/1(
)/1()/1(
2
222
222
22
22
22
2
=








+
+
−
+
−−
−








+
+
+
44444444444444 344444444444444 21
444444 3444444 21
δ
γ
σσ
σσ
σσ
µαβ
σσ
σσ
ddFssF
dHdFsHsF
ddFssF
FFc
o
ddFssF
dHdFsHsFo
RmrRnP
RmrRnP
RmrRnP
Pc
g
RmrRnP
RmrRnP
g
  .(23) 
Subsequently, the public-cost minimizing law-enforcement spending during the 
period is 
γδγ −+= )( 2og .                   (24) 
 
PROPOSITION 3: Spending on law enforcement is efficient (in the sense of 
minimizing the public costs of informal services) when    
])/1()/1][(/)([
])/1()/1[(
22
222
ddFssFFFc
dHdFsHsF
RmrRnPPc
RmrRnP
σσµα
σσ
β
+−−
+
> .  
(See proof in the Appendix.) 
 
 12
This proposition indicates that policing the sex market is desirable when the public 
costs of the expected chain-infection stemming from an informal service during the 
period exceed a threshold level. This level rises with the providers’ and clients’ costs 
of risk bearing stemming from the informal service’s health hazard relative to their 
returns on the safe formal service. It is inversely related to the difference between the 
rate of the expected extra satisfaction for the client from the informal service and the 
ratio of the informal service expected extra cost to the formal service price. The 
threshold level is also inversely related to the provider and client’s costs of risk 
bearing stemming from law enforcement relative to their returns on the safe formal 
service.  
 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
   The behavior of rational providers and clients in an apparently legal sex market, 
where a health-risking service is illegally traded alongside a safe and legal alternative, 
was analyzed. In this market, the suppliers are registered, randomly inspected and 
periodically tested for sexually transmitted diseases. They formally offer the legal 
service in a regulated fixed price. Informally, they solicit clients to have, or are 
swayed by clients to provide, the more exciting illegal service for an unreported, thus 
untaxed, extra payment. The analysis demonstrated the effects of the costs of the risk 
borne by expected-utility-maximizing providers and clients on the informal service 
equilibrium price and prevalence and their implications for the effects of law-
enforcement effort.  
   The analysis led to the following conclusions. The rate of the expected extra 
satisfaction from the informal service must be greater than the ratio of the informal 
service expected extra cost to the formal service price for the informal service to be 
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traded. The prevalence of the informal service decreases with the costs of risk bearing 
for the providers and the clients. The equilibrium price of the informal service rises 
with the service providers’ costs of risk bearing and falls with the clients’ costs of risk 
bearing. Consequently, spending on law enforcement effort lowers (raises) the 
equilibrium price of the informal service if the ratio of the providers’ and the clients’ 
degrees of absolute risk aversion is greater (smaller) than the ratio of the elasticities of 
their cost bearing with respect to law enforcement. Spending on law enforcement is 
efficient when the public cost of the expected chain-infection stemming from an 
informal service exceeds a critical level.  
   In the absence of instantaneous, inexpensive medical tests, engagement in 
unprotected informal sex service is comparable to playing Russian Roulette. The 
development and introduction of instantaneous, mandatory medical tests that are 
inexpensively and mutually applied by the service providers and their clients before 
engagement will eliminate the risk of contracting diseases for the participants in the 
sex market and for the general public and may eventually render the currently 
informal service formal.        
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APPENDIX 
The informal service equilibrium price and prevalence: From equation (6) and 
(14), the informal service market-clearing condition is 
)]([
)]()[(
)]([
)1(
22
*
22
*
gR
cPPn
gR
r
P
P
m
ssHs
FcFIF
ddHd
F
F
IF
σσ
µ
σσ
α
+
−−−
=
+
−+
                  (A.1)             
which implies that the informal service equilibrium price is  
)]([)]([
)]([)()]([)1(
2222
2222
*
gnRgR
P
r
m
gRcPngRrm
P
ddHdssHs
F
F
ddHdFcFssHsF
IF
σσσσ
σσµσσα
+++
+−++++
= .       (A.2) 
Equation 14 also implies 
d
IF
F
ddHdF
FIF Nmr
gRP
PP
))]([
)1(
22
*
σσ
α
+
−+= .        (A.3) 
Equation (6) implies, 
s
IF
ssHs
FcFIF Nn
gR
cPP
))]([ 22* σσµ ++−+= .       (A.4) 
In equilibrium, 
*
22
*
22 )]([)]([
)1( IF
ssHs
FcFIF
F
ddHdF
F Nn
gR
cPN
mr
gRP
P
)) σσ
µ
σσ
α
+
+−+=
+
−+  
            (A.5) 
implying 
)]([)/1()]([)/1(
/)(
2222
*
gRmrgRnP
Pc
N
ddHdFssHsF
FFc
IF σσσσ
µα
+++
−−
=
)
.                     (A.6) 
 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: By differentiating equation (15) with respect to the 
provider’s cost of risk bearing, 
 
22222
22
22222
2222
22222
2222
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)]}([)]([{
)]([]/)([
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)]([
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ddHdFFFc
ddHdssHs
F
F
ddHdFcFssHsF
F
F
ddHdssHs
F
F
ddHdssHs
F
F
F
ssHs
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σσσσ
σσµα
σσσσ
σσµσσα
σσσσ
σσσσα
σσ
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+−−
=
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+−++++
−
+++
++++
=
+∂
∂
  
                  .(A.7) 
Recalling corollary 1,  
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By differentiating equation (15) with respect to the client’s cost of risk bearing, 
22222
22
22222
22
22222
2222
22222
2222
22
*
)]}([)]([{
)]([]/)([
)]}([)]([{
)]([)]1(/)[(
)]}([)]([{
)]}([)()]([)1({
)]}([)]([{
)]}([)]([){(
)]([
gnRgR
P
r
m
gRmnrPc
gnRgR
P
r
m
gRnmrPcP
gnRgR
P
r
m
gRcPngRrmn
gnRgR
P
r
m
gnRgR
P
r
mcPn
gR
P
ddHdssHs
F
F
ssHsFFFc
ddHdssHs
F
F
ssHsFFFcF
ddHdssHs
F
F
ddHdFcFssHsF
ddHdssHs
F
F
ddHdssHs
F
F
FcF
ddHd
IF
σσσσ
σσµα
σσσσ
σσαµ
σσσσ
σσµσσα
σσσσ
σσσσµ
σσ
+++
+−−
−=
+++
++−−+
=
+++
+−++++
−
+++
+++−+
=
+∂
∂
                  .(A.9) 
Recalling corollary 1, 
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: 
g
g
gR
P
g
g
gR
P
g
P d
ddHd
IFs
ssHs
IFIF
∂
∂
+∂
∂
+
∂
∂
+∂
∂
=
∂
∂ )(
)]([
)(
)]([
2
22
*2
22
** σ
σσ
σ
σσ
         (A.11) 
 
and in recalling (A.8) and (A.10), 
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As the denominator of this expression is positive, and as FFc Pc /)( −> µα  (by the 
corollary), 0
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By rearranging terms and recalling equations (19) and (20), these conditions can be 
equivalently expressed as displayed in the proposition. 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: Equation (24) implies that 0>og  when 0>δ . 
This condition is satisfied when 
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which can be equivalently rendered, in recalling corollary 1, as 
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